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Abstract
This paper quantitatively investigates the macroeconomic and distributional consequences
of school closures through intergenerational channels in the medium- and long-term. The model
economy is a dynastic overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which schools, in the
form of public education investments, complement parental investments in producing children’s
human capital. We find that unexpected school closure shocks have moderate long-lasting
adverse effects on macroeconomic aggregates and reduce intergenerational mobility, especially
among older children. Lower substitutability between public and parental investments induces
larger damages in the aggregate economy and overall incomes of the affected children, while
mitigating negative impacts on intergenerational mobility.
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1 Introduction
In early 2020, a majority of governments around the world unprecedentedly decided to close day-
cares, pre-schools, and primary and secondary schools nationwide in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Interestingly, the extent to which governments engage in or maintain school closures
varies significantly over time across countries.1 The key to such decisions is understanding the
benefits and costs of school closures during the pandemic. In this regard, there has been relatively
active research on the short-run consequences of school closures, such as the benefit of keeping
parents to be involved in economic activities (e.g., Alon et al. 2020) and the epidemiological risk
associated with the reopening of schools (e.g., Isphording et al. 2020). However, there have been
few studies that quantify and enhance the understanding of various factors behind the longer-term
consequences of school closures. This line of research is important for policymakers who assess
the relative costs and benefits of school closures, not only today but also as related to potential
pandemics in the future.
In this paper, we quantitatively investigate the medium- and long-term aggregate and distri-
butional consequences of school closures through intergenerational channels.2 Specifically, we use
a dynastic overlapping generations general equilibrium model where parents are linked to children
through multiple transmission channels to study how study how school closures affect aggregate
dynamics, inequality, and intergenerational mobility over time and across cohorts. The model
economy combines a standard heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets framework with produc-
tion (Aiyagari 1994) with the model of altruistic dynasties in the tradition of Becker and Tomes
(1986), while endogenizing several additional key ingredients relevant to our research questions.
These include multi-stage human capital production technology for children (Cunha and Heckman
2007), where inputs include not only parental financial and time investments but also schools in the
form of public investments that complement parental investments. Children become young adults
with human capital and assets shaped by their parents and make their own college decisions that
affect their future life-cycle wage profiles. Aggregate production combines skilled and unskilled
workers along with capital to produce final outputs.
We calibrate the stationary equilibrium of the model to the U.S. economy in normal times.
The stationary equilibrium of our model is consistent with various empirical features such as the
increasing importance of parental financial investments over children’s age, the income quintile
transition matrix, and the rising income inequality over the life cycle, all of which are important
for the main analysis of school closures effects. For the main quantitative analysis, we model the
1The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides a daily map showing
the global status on school closures caused by COVID-19 at https://en.unesco.org/covid19/educationresponse.
2We note that we do not attempt to quantify the overall effects of school closures induced by COVID-19. Instead,
our study focuses on the consequences of school closures on intergenerational human capital transmission through the
human capital production function, while abstracting their potential effects on parents’ income or parents’ human
capital accumulation, among others. This is not because we believe that the other effects are irrelevant. Rather, it is
because COVID-19 induced various drastic measures in addition to school closures, which makes it very difficult to
empirically disentangle the partial effects of school closures on parents.
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school closure shock as an unexpected temporary decline in public investments in the child human
capital production (Fuchs-Schündeln et al. 2020). We then investigate the economy over the full
transition equilibrium paths.3 In particular, our rich framework naturally enables us to answer
how the effects of school closures differ across child cohorts of different ages at the time of the
school closure and what role the substitutability between public and private investments plays in
determining the consequences of school closures.
Our first finding on aggregate consequences is that school closures have moderate yet long-
lasting adverse effects on the aggregate economy. For instance, the year-long closure (including
vacations) would lead to up to 0.3% decline in outputs over a number of decades to follow. When
we sum up these persistent output losses over the next century, the accumulated output loss relative
to the annual output is around 14%.4 In the short term, as parents’ incentive to substitute for
the reduced public inputs increases, aggregate capital accumulation is negatively affected, which
in turn affects aggregate output negatively. More importantly, as the children directly affected by
the school closure shocks enter the labor market, the decreased human capital accumulated during
their childhood contributes negatively to outputs persistently in the following decades. On the
other hand, we find that the adverse effects of school closures on college attainment and cross-
sectional inequality are too negligible to be economically meaningful over time. We show that
general equilibrium plays a very important quantitative role in mitigating the above aggregate
effects. Specifically, when we fix the prices at the stationary equilibrium level, we find that output
effects are overstated by 50%, and college-educated labor falls by twice as much.
We then investigate the implications of school closures for intergenerational mobility. Unlike
the negligible effects on inequality, we find that the school closure shocks strengthen the extent
to which income distribution is associated between parents and children. Specifically, a 1-year
school closure would lower the probability of children born into the bottom income quintile moving
up to the top quintile by 2-3%. We also find a significant loss (around 1%) in average lifetime
income for the affected cohorts. In particular, these adverse effects on relative mobility (measured
by intergenerational elasticities and the upward mobility rate) and absolute mobility (measured
by average lifetime income changes) are found to be larger among older children. This is due
to the temporary nature of the school closure shock. We show that although young children are
more negatively affected on impact, they recover due to the equalizing effect of public education
(Fernandez and Rogerson 1998) over time without school closures.5 We further show that both
the direct impact of the school closures on the child human capital production function as well
as the endogenous parental responses, featuring positive income gradients especially in financial
3We also confirm that our model-generated data following the school shocks are reasonably in line with the causal
evidence of school closures on test scores in the Netherlands (Engzell et al. 2020) as well as time-use evidence in
Germany (Grewenig et al. 2020).
4The half-year-long closure would lead to an accumulated aggregate output loss over the next 100 years that
slightly exceeds a 5% of the annual output.
5 In fact, this is consistent with the empirical evidence by Kuhfeld et al. (2020) showing that students who lose
more ground during summer break experience steeper growth during the following school year.
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investments for older children, underlie the above findings.6
Finally, we also systematically analyze the role of substitutability between public and parental
investments in producing children’s human capital. Motivated by the possibility that this elasticity
of substitution could vary across countries, depending on the relative importance of private versus
public education system, we consider an alternative model economy with a lower elasticity (1.5
versus 3.0 in the baseline economy).7 We find that although the alternative economy is able to match
the important target statistics equally well, it results in school closure effects that differ substantially
as compared to the baseline economy. Specifically, it generates substantially larger declines in
aggregate output and lifetime income of the affected children, whereas it reduces intergenerational
mobility much less. As public investments are harder to substitute, children experience greater
losses in human capital during childhood, which is amplified by the weaker parental motive to
compensate for the fall in human capital. This muted incentive to respond also implies a smaller
parental background role, thereby generating much weaker impacts on intergenerational mobility.
Following a seminal study by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), the literature increasingly investi-
gates intergenerational economic persistence in quantitative macroeconomic models with heteroge-
neous households where the distribution of income across generations is endogenously determined.
The steady-state version of our general equilibrium model herein builds on the model in Yum (2020)
by allowing flexible substitutability between public and private investments — a departure from most
existing papers in the literature that assume that public and parental investments are perfectly sub-
stitutable.8 Unlike most existing studies that focus on steady-state comparisons, our quantitative
exercise provides one of the few numerical implementations of the equilibrium paths over the perfect
foresight transition in general equilibrium models with endogenous intergenerational human capital
transmission (Lee and Seshadri 2019, Daruich 2020).
A recent paper by Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2020) also studies the implications of school closures
in a rich two-generations lifecycle model. Although both studies share similar emphasis on the
importance of parental income and children’s age, the focus is quite different. Specifically, while
they focus on implications of school closures for affected children’s welfare and inequality, we focus
on the implications for macroeconomic aggregates and intergenerational mobility and on the role of
substitutability between public and parental investments. Moreover, unlike theirs, our key interest
of aggregate implications requires an overlapping-generations general equilibrium framework as a
natural laboratory.9
6We also explore how these school-closure effects would change in the presence of virtual schooling that dispropor-
tionately benefits children from college-educated parents, capturing better-educated parents’ advantages with better
skills and network. We find that these would mitigate average lifetime income losses of the affected children at the
expense of lower intergenerational mobility.
7For example, East Asian countries generally have large private education markets, which are believed to be very
good substitutes for public education. By contrast, in Scandinavian countries, where public educations play a huge
role, parental education investments are less likely to be an adequate substitute.
8For example, see Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Herrington (2015), Holter (2015), Lee and Seshadri (2019), and
Daruich (2020), among others.
9 In Section 4, we indeed confirm that general equilibrium effects are quantitatively important for our research
question.
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The empirical education and economics literature has shown that school interruptions can have
negative consequences for children’s learning and skills (e.g., Cooper et al. 1996, Meyers and
Thomasson 2017). A number of papers explore learning losses in terms of test scores during summer
breaks, but the evidence is somewhat mixed in terms of magnitudes (see Atteberry and McEachin
(2020) and references therein). Other papers exploit teacher strikes, weather-related school closures,
and the German short school years in the 1960s, as summarized in Hanushek and Woessmann (2020)
and Kuhfeld et al. (2020). There is a growing body of empirical literature that estimates how the
COVID-19 pandemic has affected parental responses using real-time data (e.g., Adams-Prassl et al.
2020, Bacher-Hicks et al. forthcoming, Chetty et al. 2020). For example, Chetty et al. (2020) find
that during the school closures, children, especially those who live in low-income areas, experienced
reductions in math learning, measured by online Zearn Math participation. There are also empirical
studies, such as Engzell et al. (2020) and Grewenig et al. (2020), which estimate these effects on
learning losses and parental responses in European countries, which we discuss more extensively in
Section 5. These empirical findings are broadly in line with the key mechanisms in our quantitative
theory; that is, that school closures induce human capital losses, especially among children from low
income families, and that parents try to compensate for these losses. Our quantitative theoretical
results could help better understand the underlying sources of these empirical observations.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to conduct analysis on aggregate effects
of school closures in a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous parental decisions.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2020) document the empirical literature on learning losses and suggest
that such short-term evidence could potentially point to the sizeable long-term consequences of
school closures. Building on their insight, we bring various relevant factors, such as endogenous
parental investment responses, dynamic effects on human capital, and general equilibrium consid-
erations, into a structural framework. Our consequential estimates of the negative effects on the
aggregate economy, based on the model that is broadly in line with the existing short-run empirical
evidence, are conservative but are still highly relevant given that these output declines last for
many decades to follow.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy and defines the
equilibrium. Section 3 describes the calibration strategy and the properties of the stationary equi-
librium of the calibrated model economy. Section 4 presents the main quantitative analysis of
school closures along the full equilibrium transitional paths. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model Economy
We begin by describing the model economy used for the quantitative analysis. It is based on the
model in Yum (2020), which builds on a standard incomplete-markets general equilibrium frame-
work in a production economy (Aiyagari 1994) while following the tradition of Becker and Tomes
(1986) for intergenerational transmissions. Parents face the identical multi-period human capital
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production technology but are heterogeneous in assets and productivity. To enrich the analysis of
school closures, our model allows the elasticity of substitution between parental and public invest-
ments to be less than perfect. In our equilibrium model with altruistic parents, parental choices
such as parental investments and inter-vivos transfers take into account parents’ expectations of
the future paths of the economy following unexpected school closures today.
Time (t) is discrete, and a model period corresponds to five years. Our analysis not only
considers steady states but also transitional dynamics across steady states. We now describe the
model environments in more details.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum (measure one) of overlapping generations in the economy. A household always
includes an adult but it can also include a child. As summarized in Table 1, an adult lives for eleven
model periods (age 20-74) as an active decision maker. Specifically, in the first model age j = 1,
an agent chooses whether or not to obtain a college education. Once this higher education choice
is made, the adult agent supplies labor from j = 1 until retirement at the beginning of j = 10 (age
65). The agent then lives for two more periods as a retiree and dies at the end of period j = 11
(age 75). In all periods, the agent makes a standard consumption-savings decision.
An important building block of our model is the intergenerational transmission. This initially
happens at the beginning of j = 3 (age 30) when the adult is endowed with a child. In addition
to the stochastic ability draw for the child, the parent invests time and money in their children in
multiple periods j = 3, 4, 5 while taking into account the presence of public education. Before the
child becomes independent, the parent decides the amount of inter-vivos transfers to give in j = 6.
Then, the child, now an adult, forms a new household when the parent enters j = 7, and faces the
same lifetime structure, described above.
All households share identical preferences over consumption c and hours worked n, represented







where σ > 0 and χ > 0 capture the curvatures and b > 0 is the disutility constant.
In all working-age periods (j = 1, 2, ..., 9), labor earnings y are subject to progressive taxation.
Specifically, after-tax earnings with respect to pre-tax earnings y are given by:
λj (y/ȳ)
−τj y, (2)
following a simple, yet widely used, parametric form (Benabou 2002; Heathcote, Storesletten and
Violante 2014). Note that τj shapes the degree of progressivity, λj captures the scale of taxation
and ȳ denotes average earnings. We allow τj and λj to depend on age in order to capture differences
in labor taxation across the family structure (Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2014; Holter, Krueger
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Table 1: Timeline of life-cycle events for a parent-child pair
Parent
Age 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Model age j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
← −−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Consumption-savings −−−−−−−−−−−−−− →
← −−−−−−−−−−−−− Labor supply −−−−−−−−−−−− → Retirement
College ← − Parental − → Inter-
investments vivos
Child
Age 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 ...
Model age j ← −− Childhood −− → 1 2 3 4 5 ...
← −−−−− Consumption-savings −−− →
← −−−−−−−− Labor supply −−− →
College ← − Parental − →
investments
and Stepanchuk 2019).
In all periods, capital income is subject to a tax rate of τk if the capital income is positive.
Households receive lump-sum transfers T and are allowed to borrow up to the borrowing limit
(Aiyagari 1994).
We now present the household’s decision problems sequentially starting with the first adult age
j = 1.
Model Age 1 In period t, a child who forms a new household in the model age j = 1 (20 years
old) begins their adult life with individual state variables such as age j, a human capital stock of
ht, a level of asset holdings at, the childhood learning ability φ, and the aggregate state variable
of the distribution of households in the economy πt. The two individual state variables, ht and at,
are endogenously shaped by the parent of the agent during childhood. Although childhood ability
does not enter adults’ economic decisions directly, it is still a state variable because it determines
the learning ability of their own child later in j = 3. The distribution of households in period t, πt,
is an aggregate state variable because equilibrium prices depend on the equilibrium distribution.
Given the state variables, the agent first decides whether or not to obtain a college education.
The value of not going to college (κ = 1) is given by:













subject to ct + at+1 ≤ λ1 (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τ1 wκ,t(πt)htnt + Pt + Tt




where wκ,t(πt) is the rental price of human capital for skill type κ per unit hours of work, rt(πt)
is the real interest rate, and Pt is the initial assets given by the parents (i.e., inter-vivos transfers).
Human capital increases at the gross growth rate of γj,κ, which is allowed to depend on age j and
education κ to capture the empirical age-profile of wage for each education type. Human capital
is subject to the idiosyncratic shock z, which follows an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) normal distribution with mean zero and the standard deviation of σz. We assume a standard
incomplete-markets structure by assuming that the idiosyncratic shock z is not fully insurable as a
is not a state-contingent asset. Γ(πt) captures the law of motion for the distribution of households
as perceived by households, which should be consistent with the actual evolution of the distribution
in equilibrium. Because ht+1 is uncertain in period t, households form expectation regarding the
next period’s value.
An alternative choice is to go to college and become a skilled worker. College education is
costly and requires the agent to pay a stochastic fixed cost where ξ follows an i.i.d. log normal
distribution with a mean of µξ and a standard deviation of σξ. The value of going to college after
the realization of ξ is given by:









+ βEzt+1V2(ht+1, at+1, κ, φ;πt+1)
}
subject to ct + at+1 + ξ ≤ λ1 (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τ1 wκ,t(πt)htnt + Pt + Tt (4)




The above conditional decision problem illustrates how college education could benefit households
in the model. First, college educated workers are in the skilled labor market (κ = 2), which gives
wκ,t(πt). Second, college-educated workers experience a life cycle profile of wages that differs from
that of their counterparts without a college degree through γj,κ.
Given the above two conditional value functions, households make a discrete college choice after
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observing a draw of ξ. The expected value at the beginning of j = 1 is:
V1(ht, at, φ;πt) = Eξmax {N(ht, at, φ;πt), C(ht, at, φ, ξ;πt)} . (5)
Model Age 2 In j = 2, households face a standard life cycle problem with consumption-savings
and labor supply decisions, represented by the following:









+ βEzt+1,φ′|φV3(ht+1, at+1, κ, φ
′;πt+1)
}
subject to ct + at+1 ≤ λ2 (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τ2 wκ,t(πt)htnt + (1 + rt(πt)) at − τkrt(πt)max{at, 0}+ Tt
ht+1 = exp(zt+1)γ2,κht
πt+1 = Γ(πt).
The higher education decision made in j = 1 shows up as a state variable κ. Because a child is
going to be born in the next period, households take expectation over the ability of the new child
to be born (φ′). We assume that it is correlated across generations, following an AR(1) process in
logs
log φ′ = ρφ log φ+ εφ (6)
where εφ ∼ N (0, σ
2
φ). This form of the exogenous source of a positive correlation of human capital
across generations is standard in the literature (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia 2004; Lee and Seshadri
2019; Yum 2020), capturing any intergenerational persistence, such as genetic transmission, not
endogenously explained by the model.
Model Ages 3-5 At the beginning of j = 3, a child is born with learning ability φ. Building on
the childhood skill formation literature (Cunha and Heckman 2007, Caucutt and Lochner 2020),
human capital formation is modeled as a multi-stage process that takes place in j = 3, 4, 5, featuring
parental inputs in different periods that are complementary and parental investments that are more
effective for those who have higher current human capital stock. In addition, we also introduce
public investments in different stages, which are complementary inputs to parental investments, to
capture the effects of schools (Fuchs-Schündeln et al. 2020).
The structure is similar to those in Lee and Seshadri (2019) and Yum (2020). Specifically, let
Ij denote the total investment inputs in period j, aggregated following the two nested constant
























where xj denotes parental time investments, ej is parental monetary investments, gj denotes public
education investment, and θxj ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative share of time investments in period j.
Each input is entered after being normalized by its unconditional mean. The first CES aggregation
is about parental time and money inputs. The elasticity of substitution between parental time and
money investments depends on the stage j and is given by 1/(1 − ζj), where ζj ≤ 1. The second
CES aggregation is about the aggregated parental inputs and public investments. There, we allow
the elasticity of substitution to be less than perfect, which is given by 1/(1 − ψ), where ψ ≤ 1.
Although this departure from perfect substitutability is relatively unexplored, we are going to show
that this elasticity is highly relevant to the implications of school closures in various dimensions,
as analyzed systematically in Section 5.
The aggregated inputs in different periods j = 3, 4, 5 shape the child’s human capital at the end
of j = 5. In other words, hc,6, is given by the technology f :
hc,6 = φf(I3, I4, I5). (8)
As is standard in the literature, we assume unit elasticity of substitution across periods and constant
returns to scale (e.g., Lee and Seshadri 2019, Fuchs-Schündeln et al. 2020, Yum 2020). This is










c,j , if j = 3, 4, (9)
where θIj ∈ (0, 1). Note that this technology features two properties highlighted by Cunha and
Heckman (2007) and Caucutt and Lochner (2020): (i) dynamic complementarity, meaning that
a higher hc,j increases the productivity of investments in period j (
∂2f
∂Ii∂hc,j
> 0) and (ii) self-
productivity, meaning that a higher hc,j increases human capital in the next period hc,j+1. The
initial human capital hc in j = 3 when a child is just born is set to 1 as we allow for heterogeneity
in learning ability φ (Lee and Seshadri 2019).
We now incorporate the above technology into the decision problem of parents. The following
functional equation summarizes a parent’s problem in j = 3 :










− ϕxt + βEzt+1V4(ht+1, at+1, κ, hc,t+1, φ;πt+1)
}
9
subject to ct + at+1 + et ≤ λj (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τj wκ,t(πt)htnt + (1 + rt(πt)) at − τkrt(πt)max{at, 0}+ Tt















πt+1 = Γ(πt). (11)
We assume that the child shares the household consumption c, captured by the household equiva-
lence scale q. (10) is obtained by combining (7) and (9). Parents decide how much time and money
to invest, while taking into account the returns to such investments, according to the production
technology (8), the associated costs in terms of utility ϕ, and the reduced income available for
consumption and savings.
The parent’s decision problems in j = 4, 5 are similarly given by:










− ϕxt + βEzt+1Vj+1(ht+1, at+1, κ, hc,t+1, φ;πt+1)
}
subject to ct + at+1 + et ≤ λj (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τj wκ,t(πt)htnt + (1 + rt(πt)) at − τkrt(πt)max{at, 0}+ Tt




























c,t if j = 5
(13)
πt+1 = Γ(πt).
where state variables further include the child’s human capital level at the beginning of the period
hc.
Model Age 6 At the end of j = 6, the child leaves the original household and forms a new
household. The asset level of the newly formed household is shaped by the parents’ decision
on inter-vivos transfers ac. Holding other things constant, this would facilitate the child’s college
decision indirectly by alleviating the financial burden of college. The decision problem in j = 6 is
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summarized by:





















subject to ct + at+1 + a
′
c ≤ λj (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)




Note that the continuation value now includes the initial value function of the child V1, defined
above in (5), discounted by the degree of altruism η > 0. This continuation value clearly shows
our dynastic set-up, where parents care about their child’s utility, which in turn depends on the
following generations’ utilities in the spirit of Becker and Tomes (1986). Note also that parents
cannot borrow from their child’s future income since a′c cannot be negative.
Model Ages 7-11 In periods j = 7 and onwards, the state variables do not include hc and φ
because there is no need to keep track of these after the child leaves the original household. Until
they retire in j = 10, households make consumption-savings and labor supply decisions. Hence,
the household’s problems in j = 7, 8, 9 are standard:









+ βEzt+1Vj+1(ht+1, at+1, κ;πt+1)
}
, if j = 7, 8, 9
(15)
subject to ct + at+1 ≤ λj (wκ,t(πt)htnt/ȳ)
−τj wκ,t(πt)htnt + (1 + rt(πt)) at − τkrt(πt)max{at, 0}+ T
ht+1 = exp(zt+1)γj,κht
πt+1 = Γ(πt).
After retirement, households receive social security pension benefits Ωt. The value functions in
the retirement periods (j = 10, 11) are given by:









subject to ct + at+1 ≤ (1 + rt(πt)) at − τkrt(πt)max{at, 0}+ Tt +Ωt
πt+1 = Γ(πt),
and Vj=12(·) = 0.
2.2 Firm’s Problem and Government
There is a representative firm that produces output with technology featuring constant returns to







where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, Ht is the aggregate labor input, and α ∈ (0, 1). The
aggregate labor input H is then aggregated under the CES technology following:
Ht =
[






where ρ < 1 shapes the elasticity of substitution (1/(1−ρ)) between skilled workersH2 and unskilled
workers H1.
Given the above production technology, the representative firm in competitive markets maxi-
mizes profits. One can easily show that the optimality conditions are given by:
αKα−1t H
1−α


























(1− ν)ρHρ−12,t = w2,t, (21)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
The government collects taxes from households through (progressive) labor income taxation
and capital income taxation. These tax revenues are spent on four categories: (i) social security
pension Ω to retirees; (ii) lump-sum transfers T to all households, (iii) public education expenditures
{gj}
5
j=3; and (iv) government spending G ≥ 0 that is not valued by households. We assume that
the government balances its budget each period j.
2.3 Equilibrium
Let us denote by xj,t ∈ Xj a vector of individual state variables at age j in period t in the house-
hold’s recursive problems described in the previous subsection. Given an initial distribution π−T ≡
(πj,−T )
11
j=1, a competitive general equilibrium is a sequence of factor prices {w1,t(πt), w2,t(πt), rt(πt)}
∞
t=−T ,

















t=−T over xj,t such that:
1. given the government policies and factor prices, household decision rules solve the associated
household’s life cycle problems in the previous subsection, and Vj(xj,t,πt) are the associated
value functions;











hj,tnj,t(xj,t,πt)dπj,t(xj,t|κ = s), s = 1, 2;
4. the government budget is balanced for each period: the sum of transfers payments, social
security pension payments, public education spending, and government spending is equal to
the sum of labor income tax revenues and capital income tax revenues for each period;
5. the evolution of the distribution πt is given by πt+1 = Γ(πt), which is consistent with the
household optimal choices and the exogenous probability distributions.
Note that this competitive equilibrium nests its stationary version of equilibrium where market-
clearing prices and aggregate quantities are constant over time.
3 Calibrating the Model Economy in Stationary Equilibrium
Before we evaluate the aggregate and intergenerational implications of school closures using numer-
ical experiments in the next section, we discuss how we calibrate the model economy. Our approach
is to calibrate the model in stationary equilibrium to U.S. data.
We consider two model economies in which the elasticity of substitution between public and
parental investments differs. There is limited evidence of this in the literature. A number of papers
assume perfect substitutability whereas a few papers estimate that this elasticity of substitution is
less than perfect.10 Given that there is no clear consensus on this parameter that could be useful
for understanding the theoretical mechanisms we study here, we consider two different values.
Specifically, the baseline economy uses ψ = 2/3, implying that the elasticity of substitution is 3.
This implies that public and parental investments are highly substitutable, close to a common
assumption of perfect substitutability in the literature, yet are less than perfect substitutes.11 In
10 In the literature, it is common to assume that parental and public investments are perfect substitutes. For
example, see Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Holter (2015), Lee and Seshadri (2019), Daruich (2020), Yum (2020)
among others. On the other hand, there are lower estimates of this elasticity of substitution, such as 1.92 by
Blankenau and Youderian (2015) and 2.43 by Kotera and Seshadri (2017).
11This value is similar to the one in Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2020).
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addition, we also consider an alternative model economy with ψ = 1/3, implying a lower value of
the elasticity of substitution (1.5). This alternative model would enable us to investigate the role
of the elasticity of substitution between public and private investments, which could differ across
countries.
We first discuss the parameter values that are commonly set across the two model economies.
Then, we explain the remaining parameters that are internally calibrated to match the relevant
target statistics in the U.S. We then present the properties of the baseline model economy in
stationary equilibrium before we conduct numerical experiments on school closures in the next
section.
3.1 Common Parameters
We adopt a standard approach to match relevant U.S. statistics externally and internally. We first
discuss the first set of parameters that are calibrated externally. These are also commonly set
across the two model economies that vary in terms of the elasticity of substitution between public
and parental investments.
First, for preference parameters, we set the value of σ equal to 1.5 such that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption is 2/3 and set the value of χ equal to 4/3 such that the
Frisch elasticity is 0.75 (Chetty et al. 2013). Because our model frequency is five years, the relevant
margin of labor supply adjustments includes both intensive and extensive margins. The value of q,
which determines how consumption enters into utility in the presence of a child in the household
is set to 1.59, based on the OECD equivalence scale. Next, we set āc to be 25% of average income,
which is close to the exemption limit of gift tax in the U.S.
The life cycle wage profiles for high- and low-skilled workers are governed by the gross growth
rates of human capital during adulthood {γj,κ}
8
j=1. These values are computed based on Rupert
and Zanella’s (2015) estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). As reported in
Table A2, these estimates show two notable patterns: (i) for each education group, the growth rates
are higher in the early adult periods and then decline with age, and (ii) college-educated workers
experience much higher growth rates.
We now discuss parameters related to government. Recall that the degree of progressivity
in labor taxation differs based on household structure in the model. As reported in Table A3,
progressivity tends to be higher for households with a child. The capital income tax rate τk is set
to 0.36. These taxation-related parameters are based on the estimates by Holter et al. (2019). The
next parameters are related to the public education expenditures. Here, we follow the approach used
by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2015): education expenditures by state and federal
governments are defined as public investments, while those by local government are considered to
be private investments. This is because education in the U.S. is financed locally depending on where
people live. Using the information in 2016 from the Education at Glance published by the OECD,
we compute the gj in j = 3, 4, 5 relative to steady-state output per capita to be 0.060, 0.098 and
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0.111, respectively.12 A key feature of gj is that it increases as a child progresses through education
stages. Next, following Lee and Seshadri (2019), the value for government lump-sum transfers T is
set to 2% of steady-state output per capita to capture welfare programs, and the borrowing limit
is set as a = −T/(1 + r), where r is the real interest rate in the steady state. The value of Ω is set
to imply that the social security replacement rate is 40%.
Finally, we discuss parameters related to the production sector. We set αK = 0.36 to be
consistent with the capital share in the aggregate US data. The five-year capital depreciation rate
δ is based on 2.5% of the quarterly depreciation rate. These values are standard in the literature.
We set ρ = 1/3, implying that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
is 1.5 (Ciccone and Peri 2005).
3.2 Parameters Calibrated Internally
We now discuss the parameters that are calibrated internally by matching the relevant target
statistics in U.S. data, given the value of ψ. The discussion herein focuses on the baseline economy
with ψ = 2/3, as summarized in Table 2, and the Appendix provides the calibrated parameters
for the model economy with ψ = 1/3. These parameter values are determined as minimizers of
the squared sum of the distance between the relevant statistics from the data and those from the
model-generated data. Although there is a relatively large number of parameters and targets, each
parameter is connected to its corresponding target quite well. We now explain these relationships.
All target statistics reported in Table 2 are constructed and discussed in details by Yum (2020).
The first parameter in Table 2 is β, which captures the household’s discount factor. Its relevant
target is chosen to be the annual interest rate of 4%. The next parameter b is the disutility constant
for labor supply. Its relevant target is chosen to be the mean hours worked by those aged between 30
and 65 (or j = 3, ..., 9). Assuming that the weekly feasible time endowment is 105(= 15× 7) hours,
excluding sleeping time and basic personal care, this statistic in the data yields 30.16/105 = 0.287
as a target. There is a disutility parameter ϕ for parental time investments. This parameter is
linked to B such that the marginal disutility of parental time investment is given by the marginal
disutility of work evaluated at the mean hours worked.13 Next, η governs the degree of altruism and
is calibrated to match the mean inter-vivos transfers. Because inter-vivos transfers in the model are
meant to capture financial help for college, we choose the total parental transfers made for children
during the college years.14 As a result, we obtain a target statistic of 0.056 — the ratio of the mean
parental financial transfers to the five-year GDP per-capita.
We now discuss parameters related to the child human capital production functions. Recall
that in each j, there are three parameters–θxj , θ
I
j and ζj–in (10), (12) and (13). We calibrate
12These values are in line with estimates by Holter (2015) and Lee and Seshadri (2019), the latter of who use micro
data (PSID-CDS).
13Specifically, ϕ is given by bn̄χ. We calibrate θxj to match the mean parental time investments in j, as described
below.
14Specifically, we sum the money from parents and college transfers from age 18 to 26, reported in Table 4 of
Johnson (2013), while accounting for the fraction of recipients.
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Table 2: Internally calibrated parameters and target statistics for the baseline model economy
Parameter Target statistics Data Model
β .972 Equilibrium real interest rate (annualized) 0.04 0.04
b 23.3 Mean hours of work in j = 3, ..., 9 .287 .287
η .323 Mean inter-vivos transfers/GDP per-capita .056 .057
θx
3
.753 Mean parental time investments in j = 3 .061 .060
θx
4
.397 Mean parental time investments in j = 4 .036 .036
θx
5
.259 Mean parental time investments in j = 5 .020 .020
θI
3
.571 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 3 .098 .098
θI
4
.349 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 4 .113 .111
θI
5
.229 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 5 .128 .125
ζ3 −1.78 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 3 (%) 20.9 20.5
ζ4 −0.19 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 4 (%) 14.8 15.1
ζ5 −0.12 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 5 (%) 20.2 20.5
ν .529 Fraction with a college degree (%) 34.2 34.2
µξ .244 Average college expenses/GDP per-capita .140 .140
δξ .732 Observed college wage gap (%) 75.0 85.8
ρφ .103 Intergenerational corr of percentile-rank income .341 .342
σφ .590 Gini wage .370 .369
σz .140 Slope of variance of log wage from j = 2 to j = 8 .180 .184
these parameters by exploiting the clear linkages between each of these parameters and its corre-
sponding target moment in the model economy. Specifically, θxj captures the relative importance
of parental time investments (vs. parental financial investments), and it clearly increases the mean
parental time investments in period j, which are used as target statistics. Statistics on parental
time investments are obtained from the 2003-2017 American Time Use Survey (ATUS) only with
educational, interactive activities that require the presence of both a parent and a child in a com-
mon space.15 A key feature of these moments is that the mean time investment is highest in the
earliest period j = 3 (0.061 in the model or 6.4 hours per week) and it decreases with children’s age.
The next parameter θIj increases overall parental investments in period j. Hence, we use the mean
private education spending in each period as a target moment for θIj . As discussed above, the mean
private education expenditure in the data is constructed as the sum of private spending and local
government spending because public schools are largely funded locally in the U.S. Consequently,
we obtain the target statistics of 0.098, 0.113 and 0.128 for j = 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Note that,
unlike the parental time inputs, parental financial inputs increase with children’s education stage,
in line with the existing evidence. Finally, ζj shapes the elasticity of substitution between time and
money in period j. These are calibrated to match the salient facts in the U.S. that more educated
parents spend more time with children (Guryan et al. 2008; Ramey and Ramey 2010). Specifically,
we allow our model to replicate the fact that parents who are college-educated spend around 20
15Such activities include reading to/with children, playing with children, doing arts and crafts with children, playing
sports with children, talking with/listening to children, looking after children as a primary activity, caring for and
helping children, doing homework, doing home schooling, and other related educational activities.
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percent more time with their children than those without a college degree.16 In particular, we allow
the elasticity of substitution to be j-dependent since the same elasticity of substitution would lead
to a lower educational gradient in early periods (Yum 2020). As a result, our calibration leads to a
lower elasticity of substitution in j = 3 (0.36) than in later periods (0.84 and 0.89 in j = 4 and 5,
respectively), implying that parental time and monetary investments are especially complementary
to each other when children are very young. Although not reported in Table 2, the parameter γc
that maps childhood human capital to adulthood human capital is also internally calibrated to be
3.03 such that the steady-state output per capita is normalized to 1.
The next parameters are related to college education. In the aggregate production function
(18), ν is calibrated to match the fraction of people with a college degree (34.2%). The mean of
college costs is determined by µξ, which naturally gives a target statistic: the equilibrium ratio of
the mean (tuition and non-tuition) expenses after financial aid to per capita GDP. According to
detailed procedures explained by Yum (2020), this statistic (relative to the five-year GDP) is 0.140.
The next parameter is is related to the variance of the college costs. Note that as σξ increases, the
observed wage premium would decline since college decisions are more strongly shaped by costs
relative to pre-college human capital. Therefore, its relevant target is set to be the observed college
wage premium of 75% (Heathcote et al. 2010).
Next, ρφ determines the persistence of exogenous ability across generations. We set its relevant
target as the rank correlation of family income of 0.341 (Chetty et al. 2014). Note that Chetty et
al. (2014) estimate intergenerational persistence using a proxy income variable instead of lifetime
income due to the data limitation, as is common in the literature. Therefore, our target statistic
from the model also uses proxy income.17 The last two parameters in Table 2 govern the variability
of wages in different ways. Although either would increase the overall wage inequality in the model,
the variability of the idiosyncratic shocks to adult human capital σz also shapes the rising lifecycle
inequality. Therefore, the two target statistics are the Gini coefficient of wage and the difference
between the variance of log wage at age 55-59 (j = 2) and that of log wage at age 25-29 (j = 8), as
reported in Table 2 (Heathcote et al. 2010).
The alternative model with a lower elasticity of substitution between public and parental in-
vestments (ψ = 1/3) is calibrated using the same calibration strategy. The calibration results are
reported in the Appendix.18
16To be precise, the education gradient is defined as the percentage difference in mean parental time investments
between education groups while controlling for parental observables. See the Appendix for details.
17Specifically, Chetty et al. (2014) measure a child’s income at around 30 years old, averaged over two years. The
parent’s income is averaged over five years when parents’ ages are around 45 years. Equivalently, our model-based
proxy income is measured for parents in j = 6, and for children in j = 3.
18The most notable difference, compared to the baseline model with π = 2/3, is that the elasticity of substitution
between parental time and money investments is lower (0.22, 0.58 and 0.57 for j = 3, 4, and 5, respectively).
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Table 3: Intergenerational persistence estimates
U.S. data Model
Chetty et al. Proxy Lifetime
(2014) income income
IGE: log-log slope 0.344 .309 .375
Rank corr: rank-rank slope 0.341 .342 .361
3.3 Properties of the Baseline Model in Stationary Equilibrium
In this subsection, we present the properties of the baseline model in stationary equilibrium before
we conduct the main quantitative analysis on school closures.
We first evaluate the intergenerational mobility implied by the model. Specifically, we measure
the model-implied intergenerational mobility in three ways and compared them to the data coun-
terparts. The data counterparts are from Chetty et al. (2014) who use administrative data.19 As
mentioned above, income in the model is the five-year per parent sum of labor earnings, interest
income, and social security benefits.
The first measure is the intergenerational elasticity (IGE), obtained from the following log-log
equation:
Ychild = ρ0 + ρ1Yparent + ε, (22)
where Y is log permanent income. This is a conventional way to measure the degree of intergenera-
tional persistence in the empirical literature. Its interpretation is straightforward: a 1% increase in
parental permanent income is associated with a ρ1% increase in their children’s permanent income.
The second measure is to use a rank-rank specification instead of a log-log specification (Chetty et
al. 2014). This can be estimated when Y is the percentile rank of income. This slope coefficient
(or the rank correlation) tells us that a one percentage point increase in parent’s percentile rank is
associated with a ρ1 percentage point increase in their children’s percentile rank. In the model, we
estimate these slopes using both proxy income, which is defined equivalently as its empirical coun-
terpart, and the lifetime income, which is constructed as present-value lifetime income discounted
according to the interest rate (Haider and Solon 2006) in stationary equilibrium.
Table 3 reports the two slope estimates from the data and the model. Recall that we directly
targeted to match the rank correlation using proxy income. Although data limitation prevents
researchers from investigating the lifetime income, it is possible to estimate the mobility measures
using the lifetime income in the model. As is well known in the literature, we can see that the
estimate of the IGE using lifetime income (0.376) is substantially larger than the counterpart using
19Specifically, parental income is defined as the average five-year pre-tax income per parent, which is either the sum
of Adjusted Gross Income, tax-exempt interest income and the non-taxable portion of Social Security and Disability
benefits (if a tax return is filed) or the sum of wage earnings, unemployment benefits, and gross social security and
disability benefits. For children’s income, they use a short horizon (2-year average) due to data availability.
18
Table 4: Income quintile transition matrices: data vs. model
Unit: % U.S. data Model
Chetty et al. (2014) Proxy income Lifetime income
Parent Child quintile Child quintile Child quintile
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 33.7 28.0 18.4 12.3 7.5 35.2 25.8 17.7 14.1 7.2 35.9 27.0 16.1 14.3 6.8
2nd 24.2 24.2 21.7 17.6 12.3 24.5 22.2 21.7 18.1 13.5 25.1 22.1 21.7 18.2 12.9
3rd 17.8 19.8 22.1 22.0 18.3 18.9 19.2 22.6 20.6 18.7 19.4 18.5 23.6 20.0 18.5
4th 13.4 16.0 20.9 24.4 25.4 14.0 18.1 20.2 22.4 25.3 13.4 17.6 21.6 21.9 25.6
5th 10.9 11.9 17.0 23.6 36.5 7.3 14.8 17.7 24.9 35.3 6.4 14.9 16.9 25.5 36.3
proxy income (0.309) because the short-term income may not represent the long-term lifetime in-
come (Haider and Solon 2006). Interestingly, this attenuation bias is smaller in the rank correlation
(0.342 versus 0.361).
The above slope estimates are easy to interpret and convenient, but they do not fully describe
how income distribution persists across generations. The income quintile transition matrix provides
a richer description of how economic status is transmitted across generations.20 We now compare
the quintile transition matrix from the model-generated data to the empirical quintile transition
matrix (Chetty et al. 2014). Because calibration does not directly target any elements in the
income quintile transition matrix, this is a natural way of evaluating how successful a model is as
a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility (Yum 2020).21
Table 4 reports the transition matrices, obtained from U.S. (Chetty et al. 2014) and model-
generated data. The data shows that the probability of children remaining in the bottom quintile
when their parents’ income is also in the bottom quintile is 33.7%. Similarly, the probability of
staying in the top income quintile is quite high at 36.5%. A particularly interesting one is the
probability of moving up from the bottom quintile to the top quintile, namely upward mobility.
In the data, the upward mobility rate is 7.5%. The middle panel of Table 4 displays the quintile
transition matrix from the model when the equivalent measure of proxy income is used. The model
successfully replicates the empirical patterns noted above. In particular, the upward mobility rate
in the model is 7.2%, which is very close to the data counterpart.
Table 4 also reports the quintile transition matrix using lifetime income. Compared to the one
with proxy income, we can see that the diagonal elements are generally higher, which is consistent
with lower intergenerational mobility measured by the slope coefficients in Table 3. The upward
mobility rate in terms of lifetime income is slightly lower at 6.8%. In the following numerical
experiments, we use the intergenerational mobility measures based on lifetime income because the
20An income quintile transition matrix is a 5 by 5 matrix where the (a, b) element provides the conditional proba-
bility that a child’s lifetime income is in the b-th quintile, conditional on the parent’s income belonging to the a-th
quintile. Quintiles are based on their own generation.
21Note that the same correlation of income across generations can be consistent with different quintile transition
matrices. This is similar to the fact that the same Gini coefficient can be consistent with different shapes of income
distributions.
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Figure 1: Inequality over the life cycle
Note: The left figure shows the variance of log wage by age relative to age 25-29. The right figure shows the variance
of log earnings by age relative to age 25-29. US data is from Heathcote et al. (2010).
mobility measures based on proxy income are subject to attenuation biases (Haider and Solon 2006)
as also confirmed by the model-generated data in stationary equilibrium.
As is well known, cross-sectional inequality in labor market variables tends to increase over
the lifecycle in the data (e.g., Heathcote et al. 2010). As Figure 1 shows, the model replicates
the increasing dispersion in wages (left) and earnings (right) quite well.22 We note that these
features are important because a higher dispersion in income among relatively older parents would
be transmitted into the extent to which parents with different permanent incomes afford additional
parental investments in response to school closures.
4 Quantitative Analysis of School Closures
We now move on to the main analysis of this paper on the implications of school closures. This
requires us to compute the equilibrium away from the steady state. We first explain how we
conduct the numerical experiments and then briefly discuss empirical consistency with the best
existing evidence on the short-run effects of school closures. Afterwards, our main analyses on the
medium- and long-run effects follow.
4.1 Computational Experiment Design
In this section, we analyze transitional dynamics following unexpected school closure shocks. In
the simulation, in each period, the economy consists of 11 cohorts, and each cohort is composed
of 500,000 household units. Thus, the total number of households is 5,500,000 in each period t.
We first simulate the model economy for sufficiently long periods until it reaches the stationary
22Note that this is disciplined mainly by the calibrated dispersion in idiosyncratic shocks to adult human capital.
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equilibrium.23 The economy is in stationary equilibrium at t = ...,−2,−1, 0, and school closures
unexpectedly take place at the beginning of t = 1. Our baseline exercise considers universal,
nationwide school closures where all schools are closed for the same period of time.24 As in Fuchs-
Schündeln et al. (2020), we represent these school closures by reducing the size of public investments
in the child human capital production according to the closure length. For example, if a school
closure lasts for one year, we reduce one-fifth the public investments in t = 1. We consider three
different lengths of school closures: 0.5, 1 and 1.5 years. We note that our notion of school closure
length should be interpreted in terms of academic years (AY), and should be mapped to the
actual days of school closures with caution due to the presence of breaks, even in normal times.25
In t = 2, 3, ..., there are no further shocks and the economy returns to the original stationary
equilibrium.26 We compute the transitional equilibrium paths under perfect foresight.
In addition to the consequences of school closures on macro aggregates such as output, our
analysis also focuses on heterogeneous impacts on children of different ages in which the school
closure shock hits the economy. Therefore, we will also present the results for three child cohorts
that directly experience the school closure in different ages: the cohort aged between 0 and 4
(Cohort 1 or C1) at the school closure; that aged between 5 and 9 (Cohort 2 or C2); and that aged
between 10 and 14 (Cohort 3 or C3). We also keep track of parents matched to these children to
examine intergenerational implications.
4.2 Quantitative Results
Consistency with short-run evidence on school closures Since most governments (includ-
ing the U.S. government) closed schools in early 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
there has been limited empirical evidence on the direct effects of such closures on the general child
performance even in the short run.27 Although there has been suggestive evidence to indicate sig-
nificant drops in the amount of learning (Chetty et al. 2020), the lack of data prevents researchers
23Specifically, we simulate 55 periods to reach the steady state from a given initial distribution and drop the first
50 periods. We keep the five periods of the steady state economy to keep information about parents whose children
directly experience school closures.
24 In the Appendix, we also examine the effects of partial school closures where there is a stochastic difference in
closure lenghs across households. This exercise reflects the fact that there could be regional variations in the effective
length of school closures, caused by the uncertain local pandemic progress and political factors not modeled herein.
25For example, as 4-5 months of vacation already exist in normal years, the school closure of 1-year length would
correspond to the actual days of closure for 7-8 months (including weekends). One might think that 1.5 AY is not
realistic, but given that the current forecast projects that the vaccine is going to be widely available only in 2022, we
think that it is still worth considering as an extreme case. Further, it helps us to investigate potential nonlinearity in
the effects. Finally, we note that, although school closures reduce gj for children’s human capital production, they
are not changed in the government budget because these shocks are meant to capture non-permanent school closures.
26Although shocks are temporary and relatively small, it is important to run the model economy long enough
for several reasons. First, as our key variable is lifetime income, we need to generate the whole life-cycle for the
youngest cohort that directly experienced the school closures. In addition, as we show below, school closure shocks
have long-lasting effects. In our exercises, we use t = 30.
27The empirical literature on the learning loss during summer break (Cooper et al. 1996, Atteberry and McEachin
2020) could be useful, although it might be nontrivial to apply the summer break effects to the effects of closing
during regular school periods, especially at longer horizons.
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from investigating the negative consequences of learning loss in a broader setting with causal in-
terpretations. Ideally, we would need to have observations on a large number of representative
students whose academic progress (e.g., in terms of test scores) in multiple points within a year
is observed, not only in the regular year but also during the pandemic period when schools were
almost universally closed.
An exception is Engzell et al. (2020) who use a rich nationally representative data set from the
Netherlands. Their data set satisfies all of the ideal settings mentioned above, thereby allowing them
to conduct a different-in-difference estimation. According to their estimates based on composite
scores aggregating math, reading and spelling scores for the students aged 7-11, they estimate a
learning loss of about 3.1 percentile points or 0.08 standard deviations during the lockdown which
induced school closures of 2 to 2.5 months. Although child human capital in the model does not
exactly correspond to the observed test scores, it is useful to compare how school closures affect
human capital loss in the model. In our model, we find that a 0.5-year closure leads to a human
capital loss of 2.4 percentile points or 0.07 standard deviations.28 In addition, we also find a larger
fall in children’s human capital with lower parental permanent income (Figure 6), in line with
their findings that parental education is the only significant factor shaping the negative impacts.
This comparison shows that our model generates reasonable magnitudes of negative impacts on the
children’s outcomes.29
As discussed below, parental responses to school closures are an important channel that not
only mitigates the aggregate effects but also impacts intergenerational effects. A recent paper by
Grewenig et al. (2020) provides interesting results related to our findings. They use a survey in
Germany with detailed time use information and find that children reduced their daily learning time
significantly during school closures. More interestingly, they also find that the reduction in learning
time was not statistically different by parental education or income. This is in fact consistent with
our finding below that the positive income gradients in parental responses materialize in terms of
money, not in terms of time (Figure 5).30
Aggregate Implications We now present the main systematic results from the quantitative
exercises. Figure 2 plots the dynamics of output, capital, efficiency units of labor for non-college
and college graduates following unexpected school closures of different lengths in t = 1. Overall,
the changes of these aggregate variables are small yet persistent. The top-left panel shows that
the aggregate output declines gradually over time, and this decline continues until period 11. The
top-right panel implies that the initial drop in output is due to dissaving to increase parental
28Note that the 0.5-year-closure in the model should approximately correspond to 3.5 months closure net of summer
breaks and holidays.
29Recall that human capital in our model is supposed to be a broader concept than test scores and that our model
allows any compensatory parental investments within a model period of five years, which might dampen the very
short-run loss right after school closure shocks.
30For example, parents could spend more on better tablets or online resources of higher quality (Bacher-Hicks et al.
forthcoming), which would increase the efficiency of learning, but not necessarily the time spent on these activities.
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investments. This reduction in capital is amplified over time by lower human capital formations
of those who experienced the school closures during their childhood. The bottom panels suggest
that parents increase their labor supply to earn more income, thus raising parental investments to
counter school closures. The aggregate efficiency unit of labor for each skill type starts to decrease
when the cohorts, experiencing these school closures during childhood, enter the labor market with
lower levels of human capital. This reduction in the aggregate labor continues to decline until
t = 11 and gradually recovers afterward.
Another noticeable feature is that the responses of the aggregate variables are non-linear to
the length of school closures. The top-left panel of Figure 2 demonstrates that in period 11, while
the 0.5-year-closure reduces output by less than 0.1%, the 1.5-year-closure decreases output by
more than 0.4%. The top-right panel shows that the 1.5-year-closure reduces capital three times
more than does the 0.5-year-closure. When we add up these persistent output losses over the next
century, the accumulated output loss relative to the annual output is around 5% for the 0.5-year-
closure, which increases nonlinearly with the closure length: 14% for the 1-year-closure and 26%
for the 1.5-year-closure. These non-linear responses also appear in the aggregate labor responses,
as shown in the bottom panels. These findings imply that, since school closures would have small,
non-linear, and long-lasting impacts on the aggregate economy, these impacts might be difficult to
forecast empirically in a reduced-form way.
Another noticeable feature we highlight is the general equilibrium effects that play a role in
adjusting the magnitude of the responses of these aggregate variables to the school closures. In
particular, as revealed by a comparison between Figures 2 and 3, these general equilibrium ef-
fects tend to balance the responses of the efficiency units of labor between college and non-college
graduates. Specifically, Figure 3 shows that when prices are fixed at their stationary equilibrium
levels, aggregate labor for college graduates is more significantly reduced in response to these school
closures. A change in efficiency units of labor in each education group can be driven by (i) the
fraction of the skill group relative to population (extensive margin), (ii) hours worked conditional
on working (intensive margin), and (iii) the quality of the work force (human capital). The large
reduction in the efficiency units of labor for the college-educated individuals that materializes grad-
ually over time is due to the direct loss of human capital and a relatively noticeable decrease in
college attainment indirectly driven by lower child human capital, both of which were caused by
school closures. By contrast, we see that labor efficiency for non-college graduates does not decline
as much because the reduction in human capital is offset by an increased number of people who do
not go to college in the case where prices are exogenously fixed. However, in general equilibrium, the
decrease in college attainment tends to increase the relative premium of college graduates, thereby
dampening the reductions in the efficiency units of labor for college graduates and amplifying those
for non-college graduates. Similarly, general equilibrium effects mitigate the reductions in aggregate
capital by increasing the risk-free interest rate. Consequently, general equilibrium effects moderate
the overall responses of output to these school closure shocks.
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Figure 2: Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates
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Figure 3: Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates without GE feedback
Note: Factor prices are fixed at stationary equilibrium levels
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Table 5: Distributional changes over time
Time (1 period: 5 years)
1 2 3 4 5
Steady % change rel. to
state no school closure
Closure length: 0.5 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Closure length: 1 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Closure length: 1.5 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2
We now move on to the distributional changes over time. Table 5 reports the effects of school
closures on three cross-sectional inequality measures, demonstrating that school closure shocks
bring about negligible changes in cross-sectional inequalities. In the 0.5-year-closure scenario, there
is almost no change in the Gini coefficient of current income for the first three periods and there is
an increase of at most 0.1% in the last two periods. Just as the income share held by the lowest 20
percent shows no significant change for five periods, so does the share of college graduates. Although
longer school closures result in stronger impacts on cross-sectional inequalities, the magnitude is
still insignificant. Compared to the steady state, the economy with the 1.5-year-closure generates
differences in the absolute value of the Gini income coefficient near 0.1% until t = 3 and at most
0.2% in the last two periods. This little difference also appears in both the income share held by
the lowest 20 percent and the share of college graduates. However, this finding does not necessarily
imply that school closures have limited impacts on changes in inequality across generations, which
we investigate next.
Intergenerational Implications Table 6 reports that the school closure shocks reduce intergen-
erational mobility quite substantially. Compared to the steady state, the 0.5-year-closure increases
the IGE by 0.5 to 1.0% and the rank correlation by 0.4 to 0.9%, while decreasing the upward mo-
bility by 0.9 to 1.6% across cohorts. These changes are amplified by the length of school closures.
Across cohorts, the 1.5-year-closure generates increases in the IGE and rank correlation three times
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Table 6: Effects on intergenerational mobility of lifetime income
IGE Rank cor. Upward Mobility
Steady state .375 .361 6.8%
% change rel. to
Closure no school closure, by cohort
length C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
0.5 AY 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 -0.9 -1.3 -1.6
1.0 AY 1.0 1.6 2.0 0.9 1.5 1.8 -1.6 -2.6 -2.7
1.5 AY 1.5 2.5 3.0 1.3 2.2 2.8 -2.4 -4.0 -4.3
as large as the 0.5-year-closure. Likewise, the 1.5-year-closure reduces the upward mobility two and
a half to three times more than does the 0.5-year-closure.
Note that the school closure effects on intergenerational mobility are quantitatively heteroge-
neous across cohorts: the older cohorts are, the more reduced intergenerational mobility is. While
the 1-year-closure increases the IGE by 1% for C1, it does so by 2% for C3. The rank correlation
also has similar differences across cohorts. In response to the 1-year school closure, the rank correla-
tion increase for C3 is three times that for C1. Similarly, given a school closure, older cohorts suffer
from a greater reduction in upward mobility. The 1-year-closure decreases C1’s upward mobility
rate by 1.6% but C3’s by 2.7%. These patterns are preserved regardless of the length of school
closures. Both the 0.5-year-closure and the 1.5-year-closure lead older cohorts to experience greater
reductions in upward mobility and larger increases in IGE and rank correlation.
To understand these intergenerational implications, it is useful to first examine the direct effects
of school closures on the human capital production function. For this purpose, Figure 4 plots the
effects of changes in gj on the level of human capital produced for an average child as a function of
parental investments aggregated from time and money with the calibrated parameters. Note that
because parental investments are largely shaped by income, the horizontal axis can be interpreted
as the parental socioeconomic status (SES).
There are several noticeable features. First, longer school closures bring about greater reductions
in child human capital. Second, within a cohort, parents with low SES experience greater reductions
in child human capital. Since the portion of public investment gj is greater for lower SES parents,
they are more adversely affected by school closures. In addition, this parental SES gap tends to
increase with the child’s age. These features suggest that overall damages to child human capital
increase with the length of school closures; children from parents with low SES experience larger
damages than those with high SES parents and this difference is greater for older cohorts.
In addition to the direct effects of school closures, the other important mechanism is related
to endogenous parental responses: parents have incentives to respond to this reduced child hu-
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Figure 4: Direct effects of school closures on the child human capital production function
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Note: The figures plot the jc-period human capital output for children with average human capital in jc in stationary
equilibrium and φ = 1. The range of parental investments in the horizontal axis are a composite of parental
investments when parental time and money vary from 0 to twice the mean values in stationary equilibrium. The
upper panels show production levels with different school closure lengths. The bottom panels plot changes in level
relative to the case without school closures.
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Figure 5: Parental responses by parental permanent income
Note: A set of five bars plots changes in parental investments by the quintile of parent’s permanent income for each
cohort, ordered by the child’s age during the 1-year school closure. The left shows time investment responses and the
right shows monetary investment responses.
man capital following school closures by increasing their parental investments. Note that parental
investment behaviors are different according to their children’s age. As shown in Table 2, the
importance of financial relative to time investments increases with children’s age, in line with esti-
mates by Del Boca et al. (2014). These calibration results imply that parental investments in time
are more crucial in forming human capital in the very early childhood period (C1), but parental
financial investments become more important in later periods (C2 and C3). In addition, the degree
of complementarity between time and monetary investments is much stronger in C1 than in C2
and C3.
This age-dependent human capital production technology brings about differences in the compo-
sition of parental investments according to the child’s age. Figure 5 presents the parental responses
to the 1-year-closure by parental lifetime income (or permanent income). Although the average
time investment response is smaller, the monetary one is larger for older children (C2 and C3).
Note that when children are aged between 0 and 4, richer parents invest in time more than poorer
parents do, but this gap is small because time constraints are more equally distributed across par-
ents than budget ones. The richer parents cannot easily compensate financially for the lack of
time investments, as monetary investments are not as effective as or easily substitutable for time
investments for children in the early period. In the later periods, as financial investments become
more important, richer parents substitute time between the two more than poor parents do. Fur-
ther, note that financial investments can better substitute time investments for older children (due
to lower elasticities of substitution) and that parents’ income dispersion increases with age, which
would show up as greater dispersions in financial investments for older children, as demonstrated
in Figure 1. These jointly result in substantial positive income gradients in monetary investment
responses for the older children cohorts (C2 and C3).
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Table 7: Effects on inequality and loss of lifetime income
Lifetime income Fraction of
Gini index Average College-educated
Steady state .293 4.15 .342
% change rel. to
Closure no school closure, by cohort
length C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
0.5 AY 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
1.0 AY 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.9 -1.3 -1.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8
1.5 AY 0.1 0.2 0.2 -1.3 -2.0 -2.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.3
These heterogeneous parental investments play an important role in generating disparities in
child human capital formations. Recall that, as demonstrated by Figure 4, all three cohorts ex-
perience a reduction in human capital due to the direct effects of school closures, but children
with low-income parents are disproportionately affected. In addition, the heterogeneous parental
investments discussed above amplify these differences. For the older cohorts (C2 and C3), larger
differences in parental monetary investments lead to greater disparities in the changes of human
capital across parental income groups, which in turn shapes intergenerational mobility. As a result,
intergenerational mobility decreases more in the older cohorts (C2 and C3).
Next, we investigate how school closures influence the overall economic status (or absolute
mobility) by cohort and the dispersion of lifetime income within cohorts. Table 7 reports the
effects of school closures on the average and inequality of lifetime income. While these school
closures have small impacts on lifetime income inequality, the average reveals substantial losses.
Specifically, the 0.5-year-closure increases the lifetime income Gini coefficient by less than 0.1%
over cohorts. The effect on lifetime inequality is still negligible for the longer school closures. The
two longer school closures increase the Gini coefficient by 0.1 to 0.2%, while resulting in sizeable
lifetime income losses. The 0.5-year-closure reduces average lifetime income by 0.4 to 0.7%; the
magnitude increases with the length of school closures.
Note that school closures bring about more significant losses in lifetime income for older children
(C2 and C3) than for the youngest cohort (C1). This is indeed not necessarily inconsistent with
the literature highlighting the importance of early childhood in human capital formation (Heckman
2008). On impact, school closures have the strongest substantial impacts on child human capital
for the youngest pre-school-aged cohort (C1), as shown in Figure 6. Although this might seem
inconsistent with the above results on lifetime income loss, it becomes clearer when we recall that
the school shocks are temporary. As can be seen in Figure 7, differences in losses in human capital
for C1 become narrower over time, as the public investments play an equalizing role (Fernandez
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Figure 6: Child human capital in the next period by parental permanent income
Note: A set of five bars plots percent changes in the next period human capital on impact by the quintile of parent’s
permanent income for each cohort, ordered by the child’s age during the 1-year school closure.
Figure 7: Effects of school closures on child human capital (initially aged 0-4) over time, by parental
permanent income
Note: A model period corresponds to five years. This figure plots percent changes in the next period human capital
(relative to the case without school closure shocks) of children who are affected by school closures when jc = 1 (age
0-4).
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and Rogerson 1998). This is in line with the empirical evidence by Kuhfeld et al. (2020) who find
that students who lose more ground during the summer of 2018 tend to experience steeper growth
during the next school year. In fact, this narrowing gap in school closures’ negative consequences
is closely related to the direct effect of school closures on the human capital production function
that is heterogeneous across parental SESs. Specifically, Figure 4 shows that, although child human
capital with a lower parental SES is more adversely affected, corresponding marginal productivity
of aggregate investments, measured by the slope of the below graph becomes greater. While these
young children experience gains in the next coming years, children from lower parental SES benefits
the most, thereby narrowing the gap over time. This results in differences in the changes of college
attainment across cohorts. The fraction of college-educated is reduced more in C2 and C3 than in
C1.
The role of parental skills and knowledge in virtual schooling Although schools have
been struggling in the beginning, they gradually adapt to online teaching during the school closures
induced by the COVID-19 pandemic (Kuhfeld et al. 2020). In principle, virtual schooling could
mitigate the negative consequences of school closures on child learning. The empirical evidence
tends to suggest potential positive income gradients in online learning (Bacher-Hicks et al. 2020).
Although it can be explained by financial investment responses for the quality of home learning
environment such as laptops and tablets (Andrew et al. 2020), it could also capture the direct effects
of parental skills and knowledge, which could enhance their children’s virtual teaching experience
given the same financial investments.
To quantitatively explore how much this effect can be relevant to the school-closure effects we
have studied, we consider an alternative scenario where college-educated parents are able to fully
mitigate the school closures through virtual schooling. More precisely, college-educated parents do
not experience the fall in public investments in their children’s human capital production function
when the school closure shock hits the economy. This exercise is designed to provide an upper
bound of the effects of such skill-gradients in virtual schooling.
As expected, we find that average income losses are mitigated substantially. For example, the
year-long closure reduces the average lifetime income by -0.6% for C1 and by -1.0% for C2 and C3.
These are much weaker than the baseline results reported in Table 7 (-0.9% for C1 and -1.3% for C2
and C3). More importantly, we find that the model generates stronger impacts on intergenerational
mobility, as compared to the baseline experiment (e.g., IGE increases by 1.4%, 2.2% and 2.4% for
C1, C2, and C3, respectively, as compared to 1.0%, 1.6% and 2.0%, respectively). The effects
of school closures on lifetime income inequality almost doubles but are still very small, raising a
Gini coefficient by 0.1-0.3%. These results suggest that virtual schooling that disproportionately
benefits children from more-educated parents could mitigate average income losses at the expense
of lower intergenerational mobility.
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Figure 8: Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates with a lower elasticity of substitution between
public and parental investments
4.3 The role of the elasticity of substitution between public and private invest-
ments
To examine the role of the elasticity of substitution between public and private investments, we
consider an alternative model economy with a lower elasticity of substitution (1.5 or ψ = 1/3) than
the baseline economy (3.0 or ψ = 2/3) and recalibrate the model to match the same set of target
statistics presented in Table 2. We note that this elasticity of substitution, 1/(1−ψ), could reflect
education systems that vary across countries. For example, it is likely that Scandinavian countries
where public services play a major role in education would have a lower elasticity of substitution
than East Asian countries, such as South Korea, where private education is prevalent and large in
market size (Kim, Tertilt, and Yum 2019). Therefore, our analysis herein intends to provide useful
considerations for different countries with different approaches to public and private education.
Figure 8 shows the aggregate level evolution of output, capital, efficiency units of labor for
non-college and college graduates in the case with a lower elasticity of substitution. As shown
in a comparison of Figure 2, although all these aggregate variables fall as in the case with a
higher elasticity of substitution, the magnitudes are greater in the case with a lower elasticity of
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Table 8: Effects on intergenerational mobility of lifetime income with a lower elasticity of substi-
tution between public and parental investments
IGE Rank cor. Upward Mobility
Steady state .372 .359 6.7%
% change rel. to
Closure no school closure, by cohort
length C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
0.5 AY 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8
1.0 AY 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2
1.5 AY 1.2 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.3 -1.4 -1.7 -1.8
substitution. While the 1-year-closure decreases the aggregate output by up to 0.3% in the case
with a higher elasticity of substitution (Figure 2), it does so by around 0.5% in the case with a lower
elasticity of substitution. A decrease in aggregate capital in t = 12 in the case with a lower elasticity
of substitution is double that of the baseline economy. Effective labor units for both non-college and
college graduates also show two times greater reductions. These results suggest that school closures
bring greater declines in aggregate variables for countries wherein public educational investment is
difficult to substitute with private educational investment, such as Scandinavian countries.
Table 8 shows intergenerational mobility of lifetime income in the case with a lower elasticity of
substitution between public and parental investments. As revealed by a comparison with Table 6,
as the degree of complementarity increases (lower ψ), the effects of school closures become weaker
on intergenerational mobility. In all cases with three different closure lengths, increases in the
IGEs in the case with a lower elasticity of substitution is half as large as in the baseline model.
Likewise, increases in the rank correlation in the case with a lower elasticity of substitution is less
than those in the case with a higher elasticity of substitution. The upward mobility also displays
similar patterns: the declines in the upward mobility rate in the case with a lower elasticity of
substitution are smaller than those in the baseline model.
As demonstrated previously with Figures 5 and 6, for C2 and C3, the substitution of time into
financial investments plays a role in increasing differences in the responses of child human capital
to school closures across parental permanent income groups, thereby reducing intergenerational
mobility. These differences in the case with a lower elasticity of substitution are smaller than those
in the case with a higher elasticity of substitution because this lower elasticity weakens parents’
incentive to compensate for school closures. As a result, Figure 9 shows that, on average, parental
responses are substantially weaker in the model with a lower elasticity of substitution as compared
to the baseline model. These more muted responses in parental investments result in smaller gaps
in child human capital changes, as shown in a comparison between Figures 6 and 10. These findings
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Figure 9: Parental responses by parental permanent income with a lower elasticity of substitution
between public and parental investments
Note: A set of five bars plots changes in parental investments by the quintile of parent’s permanent income for each
cohort, ordered by the child’s age during the 1-year school closure. The left shows time investment responses and the
right shows monetary investment responses.
imply that in countries where public investments are crucial and irreplaceable, school closures could
have smaller impacts on intergenerational mobility.
Finally, Table 9 shows the responses of the average and inequality of lifetime income to school
closures in the case with a lower elasticity of substitution. As in the baseline model (Table 7), these
school closures have little impact on lifetime inequality. However, school closures generally induce
larger losses in lifetime income in this model. As mentioned previously, under a lower elasticity of
substitution between public and private investments, it is difficult to compensate for the lack of
public investments with parental financial investments, thus increasing overall loss of child human
capital, as shown in the comparison between Figures 6 and 10. Therefore, this greater reduction
in child human capital leads to a larger decrease in overall college attainment and a larger drop in
average lifetime income. Another interesting difference from the baseline model is that the average
lifetime income loss for C1 becomes disproportionately larger, mainly caused by the much more
significant initial impact on human capital, as shown in Figure 10.
To summarize, a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between public and private invest-
ments leads to a larger reduction in the aggregate variables and average lifetime income but a
lesser reduction in intergenerational mobility. These results are driven by reduced substitutions by
parental financial investments, generating overall greater but less heterogeneous changes in child
human capital across parental permanent income groups.
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Figure 10: Child human capital by parental permanent income with a lower elasticity of substitution
between public and parental investments
Note: A set of five bars plots percent changes in the next period human capital on impact by the quintile of parent’s
permanent income for each cohort, ordered by the child’s age during the 1-year school closure.
Table 9: Effects on inequality and loss of lifetime income with a lower elasticity of substitution
between public and parental investments
Lifetime income Fraction of
Gini Average College-educated
Steady state .291 4.15 .342
% change rel. to
Closure no school closure, by cohort
length C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
0.5 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
1.0 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -1.8 -1.9 -1.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.7
1.5 AY 0.2 0.2 0.2 -2.8 -3.0 -2.7 -1.4 -1.5 -1.3
36
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated how school closures affect the aggregate economy, inequality, and
intergenerational mobility through intergenerational human capital transmissions in the medium
and long term. Using a dynastic overlapping generations general equilibrium model wherein al-
truistic parents invest in their children’s human capital, which complements public schooling, we
have found three main results. First, school closures bring about moderate yet long-lasting adverse
effects on the aggregate economy. General equilibrium effects play a substantial role in reshaping
aggregate variables’ dynamics. Second, school closures reduce the average lifetime income and in-
tergenerational mobility of directly affected children, and these reductions are more severe for older
children cohorts. These results are driven mainly by parental investment responses that differ by a
child’s age and parental income. Finally, we have shown that substitutability between public and
private investment shapes school closure costs in a non-trivial way. While a lower elasticity of sub-
stitution induces more significant damages in the aggregate economy and overall lifetime incomes
of the affected children, it mitigates a reduction in intergenerational mobility. The key underlying
mechanism for both changes is the dampened parental motives to compensate for the lack of public
investments in the presence of lower substitution possibility.
Given these clear, interesting differences driven by substitutability between public and parental
investments, we believe that school closure shocks could provide ideal opportunities to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between public and private investments, which could vary across countries.
The availability of more data in the near future would make it possible to perform such analysis
and contribute to the literature in which there is limited empirical evidence for this substitution
elasticity that we have shown to matter quantitatively not only for child human capital formations
but also for aggregate dynamics. Likewise, our model framework would be useful for studying
unexplored interesting research topics as data become more available and more accessible. For
example, an interesting normative question is how to optimally make up for losses from school
closures dynamically by adjusting the length of school operations in the near future. This more
short-run oriented question would require the model to have a high frequency such as 6 months, but
probably not additional forces such as general equilibrium, which could balance the computational
burden. We leave these interesting related questions for future work.
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Most calibration targets are based on samples from the 2003-2017 waves of the ATUS, combined
with the Current Population Survey (Yum 2020). Table A1 reports the estimation results that are
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Table A1: Education gradients in parental time investments
j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
College-educated 1.342 .561 .416
(.133) (.109) (.091)
Sex -2.62 -1.51 -1.20
(.123) (.101) (.083)
Age -.041 .016 .023
(.009) (.007) (.006)
Married -.911 -.318 -.102
(.085) (.064) (.053)
R2 .023 .014 .017
Average x 6.43 3.78 2.06
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The dependent variable is parental time investments (weekly
hours). These estimates are from Yum (2020).
Table A2: Gross growth rates of human capital by age and education
j = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
γj,1 1.231 1.052 1.017 1.004 0.998 0.995 0.994 0.994
γj,2 1.317 1.152 1.101 1.063 1.032 1.004 0.975 0.942
Notes: The reported values are based on the estimates from the PSID samples in Rupert and Zanella (2015).
used to compute the educational gradients in parental time investments. The sample is restricted to
households who have any number of children and aged between 21 and 55 (inclusive), as in Guryan
et al. (2008). The three periods in the model (j = 3, 4, 5) correspond to the youngest children’s
age bands: ages 0-4, ages 5-9, and ages 10-14, respectively. The coefficient on the dummy college
variable, divided by the corresponding average, captures the educational gradient while controlling
for parents’ sex, age, and marital status. We note that the college coefficients are quite stable
regardless of control variables, in line with the evidence in Guryan et al. (2008).
Table A2 reports the gross growth rates of human capital by age and education. These are
computed based on the estimates from the PSID samples in Rupert and Zanella (2015).
Table A3 reports the estimates of τj and λj in labor taxation by age, obtained from Holter
et al. (2019). We use the estimates for single households for j = 1, 2, and the estimates for
married households for the later periods (either with a child for j = 3, ..., 6 or without children for
j = 7, 8, 9). Table A3 also reports the estimates of gj . The public and private education investments
are based on the 2016 information in the 2019 Education at a Glance by the OECD. We consider
pre-primary as j = 3, primary as j = 4, and secondary as j = 5 in the model. We treat state and
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Table A3: Parameter values for progressive taxation and public education investments
τj λj gj
j = 1, 2 .1106 .8177 j = 3 0.060
j = 3, ..., 6 .1585 .9408 j = 4 0.098
j = 7, 8, 9 .1080 .8740 j = 5 0.111
Notes: τj and λj are based on the estimates in Holter et al. (2019). Public education investments gj are based on
2019 Education at a Glance (OECD).
federal government spending as public investments while local government spending is included
in the private investments (Restuccia and Urrutia 2004; Holter 2015). See Yum (2020) for more
details. Although this method does not exploit micro-level data directly, it is reassuring that these
estimates are generally in line with those by Lee and Seshadri (2019) who use a micro data set
(PSID-CDS).
A.2 Partial (stochastic) closures
We also consider additional experiments based on partial school closures. Specifically, we assume
that school closures are still unexpected but there is another dimension of uncertainty: half of
the agents still experience full closures, but the other half experience a school closure of limited
intensity. This within-period variation could capture additional closures due to local outbreaks
of COVID-19 cases even after re-opening nationwide. This could also capture the variability of
effectiveness of online substitute teaching by schools. The results reported below are based on a
partial intensity of 50%. Our findings suggest that the main findings are generalizable in terms
of the relationship between average school closure length and the corresponding aggregate effects.
But they also suggest that partial closures induce additional variations that happen within each
cohort.
A.3 Additional figures and tables
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Figure A1: Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates: Partial closures
Note: A half of agents experience full closures whereas the other agents experience partial closures, the intensity of
which is given by 50%.
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Figure A2: Evolution of equilibrium prices in the baseline model
Note: The top panel shows the equilibrium interests over the transition. The middle panel shows the equilibrium
wages for non-college workers, and the bottom panel shows the equilibrium wages for college-educated workers over
the transition
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Table A4: Distributional changes over time: Partial closures
Time (1 period: 5 years)
1 2 3 4 5
Steady % change rel. to
state no school closure
Closure length: 0.5 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Closure length: 1 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.1
Closure length: 1.5 AY
Gini income .341 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1
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Table A5: Effects on intergenerational mobility of lifetime income: Partial closures
IGE Rank cor. Upward Mobility
Steady state .375 .361 6.8%
Closure % change rel. to
length no school closure, by cohort
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
All children
0.5 AY 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.7 -0.7 -1.2 -1.0
1.0 AY 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.1 1.4 -1.2 -2.2 -2.2
1.5 AY 1.1 1.8 2.2 1.0 1.7 2.1 -1.8 -3.1 -3.3
Children who experienced full closure
0.5 AY 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 -0.7 -1.5 -1.0
1.0 AY 1.0 1.6 2.0 0.9 1.5 1.8 -1.5 -2.8 -2.5
1.5 AY 1.5 2.4 3.0 1.3 2.2 2.8 -2.4 -4.3 -4.1
Children who experienced 50% closure
0.5 AY 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -0.9
1.0 AY 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 -0.9 -1.5 -1.9
1.5 AY 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.1 1.3 -1.2 -2.0 -2.3
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Table A6: Effects on inequality and loss of lifetime income: Partial closures
Lifetime income Fraction of
Gini Average College-educated
Steady state .293 4.15 .342
Closure % change rel. to
length no school closure, by cohort
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
All children
0.5 AY 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
1.0 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6
1.5 AY 0.1 0.1 0.2 -1.0 -1.5 -1.5 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9
Children who experienced full closure
0.5 AY 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5
1.0 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.9 -1.3 -1.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0
1.5 AY 0.1 0.2 0.2 -1.3 -2.0 -2.0 -0.7 -1.3 -1.5
Children who experienced 50% closure
0.5 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
1.0 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
1.5 AY 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1
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Table A7: Internally calibrated parameters and target statistics for the alternative model economy
with a lower elasticity of substitution between public and parental investments
Parameter Target statistics Data Model
β .972 Equilibrium real interest rate (annualized) 0.04 0.04
b 23.4 Mean hours of work in j = 3, ..., 9 .287 .287
η .322 Mean inter-vivos transfers/GDP per-capita .056 .056
θx
3
.895 Mean parental time investments in j = 3 .061 .061
θx
4
.374 Mean parental time investments in j = 4 .036 .036
θx
5
.168 Mean parental time investments in j = 5 .020 .020
θI
3
.623 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 3 .098 .098
θI
4
.348 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 4 .113 .112
θI
5
.224 Mean parental monetary investments in j = 5 .128 .127
ζ3 −3.55 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 3 (%) 20.9 20.3
ζ4 −0.73 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 4 (%) 14.8 14.8
ζ5 −0.74 Educational gradients in parental time in j = 5 (%) 20.2 20.1
ν .530 Fraction with a college degree (%) 34.2 34.2
µξ .245 Average college expenses/GDP per-capita .140 .140
δξ .732 Observed college wage gap (%) 75.0 84.9
ρφ .141 Intergenerational corr of percentile-rank income .341 .338
σφ .590 Gini wage .370 .370
σz .141 Slope of variance of log wage from j = 2 to j = 8 .180 .181
Table A8: Distributional changes over time with a lower elasticity of substitution between public
and parental investments
ξ = 1/3 Time (1 period: 5 years)
1 2 3 4 5
Steady % change rel. to
state no school closure
Closure length: 0.5 AY
Gini income .340 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Closure length: 1 AY
Gini income .340 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Closure length: 1.5 AY
Gini income .340 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Bottom 20% inc (%) 7.73 -0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Share of college (%) 34.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.1
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